Abstract. Aiming at the security problems and tag's cost problems of RFID, an improved light-weight RFID mutual-authentication protocol was proposed ,this protocol has proved to be save by BAN logic formal analysis method. Besides, Security analysis shows that the protocol possesses robust security as well as defending against malicious attacks such as disclosure attack, desynchronization attacks ,impersonation attack .It has better security and less consumption resource of computing and storage, etc.
Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification, RFID is a kind of non -contact technology to automatically identify people or objects. This recognition requires no physical contact or any other visible contact [1, 2] . RFID tags because of its small size, easy to carry, low cost, easy to use and so on, RFID system is widely used in supply chain management occasions, digital library management occasions, anti fake electronic passport system, build intelligent network environment [3 ,4] , etc.
The RFID system includes three parts, the back-end database, the reader and the tag. The communication channel between the back-end database and the reader is generally considered as safe and reliable; The channel between Reader device and the tag exposed to the air, easy to be monitored, further more, the reader or tag can be forged or cheated, therefore, we need to design a reliable bidirectional authentication protocol for the communication between reader and tag, which is used to ensure the security of the whole RFID system [5, 6] .
Many authentication protocols based on pseudo-random number generators have been proposed, which can achieve security and privacy protection, meanwhile, some lightweight RFID authentication protocols based on bit operations and HASH functions have been proposed, but these protocols are more or less exist safe and less efficient problems.
The authentication scheme proposed in the literature [7] can not resist the attack, the attacker can replay the message, so that the key between the reader and the tag is not consistent, thereby undermining the subsequent authentication between the two; The essence of the authentication scheme proposed in the literature [8] is a search protocol, which can not be considered as a two-way authentication protocol; The authentication scheme proposed in the literature [9] can not resist active attacks. The attacker can analyze the reply information of the tag by constantly asking the tags, and then all the key information stored in the tag can be deduced completely; The proposed authentication scheme proposed in the literature [10] cannot provide backward privacy security; The proposed scheme in the literature [11] can not resist brute force attacks, because R1 and R2 use cleartext, so an attacker can easily access the R1 and R2, using the exhaustive method can derive the stored key information from the tag; The literature [12] proposed cross bit operation according to the knowledge of genetic algorithms Cro (X, Y) , with the combination of XOR and Rot algorithm CURAP is proposed, but CURAP is too complex in the operation, and do not make use of their own label information stored, at the same time, after each certification ended, the need to update the content too much, which will to increase the amount of calculation and the increase of storage space, and the analysis shows that the protocol security is insufficient. According to the existing research results, this paper combines CRC and Cro algorithm proposed an improved lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol. In the premise of not increasing the cost and the Fig. 2 The improved protocol.
The certification procedure for the entire protocol is described as follows: (1) The reader sends a "Hello" signal to the tag, and initiates a request for authentication; (2) After receiving the authentication request which is sent by the reader, the tag will be sent to the reader ID_L stored by itself as a response; (3) After the reader receives the ID_L sent by the tag, it start to check whether there is a ID_L in the stored information. If does not exist, the label is forged, the certification immediately stopped; If there is, then the reader generates a random number r of length of L bits; and then with the ID_R corresponding to the ID_L to calculate the value of A, using K, ID_R, ID and R to calculate the value of B, and finally pass the value of A and B to the tag; (4) After receiving the value of A and B sent by the reader, The tag first to calculate A⊕ID_R with ID_L stored by itself, so you can get a random number r, the using the r that has been calculated and the K, ID_R, ID stored by itself to verify the correctness of the B, that is:
If B`and B are not equal, that the reader is a forgery, authentication immediately stop; if B`and B are equal, that the reader is legitimate, then the tag uses the r that generated by itself and the K, ID_R, ID stored by itself to calculate the value of D, and finally sent the value of D to reader; (5) After the reader receives the value of D sent by the tag, the reader first uses the R which are generated by itself and the K, ID_R, ID stored by itself to verify the correctness of the D, that is: D`= CRC(Cro(K, r) || ID_R ⊕ ID). If D`and D are not equal, implement step (6); If D`is equal to D, the tag is legitimate, then the reader uses the r that generated by itself and the K, ID_R stored by itself to calculate the value of K new, And start updating the secret key K old = K new , K new = CRC(Cro(r , ID_R) ⊕ K) , Then use r to calculate the value of E, and finally sent the value of E to the tag; (6) The reader uses the r that generated by itself and the K old , ID_R, ID stored by itself to verify the correctness of the D, that is: D``= CRC(Cro(K old , r) || ID_R ⊕ ID).
If D``and D are not equal, that the tag is a forgery, authentication immediately stop; if D``and D are equal , that the tag is legitimate, then the reader uses the r that generated by itself and the K, ID_R stored by itself to calculate the value of K new, And start updating the secret key K old = K new , K new = CRC(Cro(r , ID_R) ⊕ K), Then use r to calculate the value of E, and finally sent the value of E to the tag; (7) After receiving the value of E from the reader, firstly the tag uses the K, ID_R stored by itself and the value received from A to verify the correctness of the E, that is: E`= CRC(Cro(A⊕ID_R , ID_R) ⊕ K) ⊕(A⊕ID_R).
If E`and E are not equal, that the reader is a forgery, authentication immediately stop; if E`and E are equal , that the reader is legitimate, Then the tag uses the received r to calculate the value of r ⊕E, then can get Knew, and the tag begins to update the key K = Knew.
BAN Logic Formal Analysis
In this protocol, BAN logic analysis method is used to formalize the protocol. The relevant knowledge of BAN is described in detail in the literature [13] , including its syntax, inference rules
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and steps. Using BAN logic formalized analysis was carried out on the protocol, the procedure is as follows.
( 
(If the main body of the P believes the Shared key between the main body of P and Q, and P has received the encrypted X, which Encrypted with K, Then P believes the message X sent from the main body of Q), then we can get
By the assumption of P9 and message freshness rules
, (If a part of a message is fresh, then the whole message is fresh) then we can get
According to the formula
which had been derived, and random number verification rules
, we can get
, Initialization hypothesis P13 and Jurisdiction rule
. Therefore, the target G1 is proved. By using the above conditions and rules, the same, in the same way, we can get A
. That is to say, target G2, G3 and G4 have been proved, not repeat them here.
Security Analysis

Advances in Engineering Research (AER), volume 102
Fake Attack. When the attacker disguised as a legitimate reader, you can obtain the values of ID_L
Performance Analysis
The performance of the lightweight RFID bidirectional authentication protocol is evaluated in terms of the amount of computation, storage space and so on. The performance comparison between this protocol and several other lightweight authentication protocols is shown in Table 1 :
In Table 1 : this agreement only need to store the ID, ID_L, ID_R, K of the four variables, so as to reduce the storage space of RFID tags; The reader generates a random number r, the tag does not generate random number, so the end tags do not need to install the random number generator, reducing the total number of gate circuit at the same time, appropriate to reduce the cost of tag; At the end of each certification between tag and reader, the complex calculation process of the shared key is calculated at the end of the reader, and then passed to the tag, the tag only need a simple XOR operation can be get the shared key, thereby reducing the amount of calculation of the end tag to a certain extent; This protocol the tag end is used method of connection, XOR, cross operation, less computation of cyclic redundancy check, so as to ensure the computation of the certification process does not increase significantly. 
Summary
This paper presents an improved lightweight RFID bidirectional authentication protocol. Make full use of tag ID information stored by the reader and tag by themselves as the two certified messenger, by using a simple CRC operation and cross bit operation at the end of the tag to achieve mutual authentication between the tag and the reader, and under the premise of ensuring no increase in the amount of calculation, the protocol can effectively resist various denial of service attacks, desynchronization attacks, impersonation attacks and other malicious attacks, ensuring that the limited resources of low cost to complete the two-way authentication on the tag. The correctness and security of the protocol are verified by the formal analysis of BAN logic.
